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Abstract 
An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare; I 
address it by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping 
prevalence is negatively correlated with worker’s income and consumer’s monitoring ability and 
positively with consumer’s income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The 
results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering 
monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and 
compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping 
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1.  Introduction 
  One of the main questions about social norms is why they are created. Some economists 
argue that social norms are created as a means of society to increase economic efficiency and 
social welfare in cases of market failure. Arrow (1971), for example, wrote, “I want, however, to 
conclude by calling attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of social behavior, 
including ethical and moral codes. I suggest as one possible interpretation that they are reactions 
of society to compensate for market failures.” Two paragraphs below Arrow adds, “There is a 
whole set of customs and norms which might be similarly interpreted as agreements to improve 
the efficiency of the economic system (in the broad sense of satisfaction of individual values) by 
providing commodities to which the price system is inapplicable.” Other economists, however, 
oppose this view and argue that social norms are created for various reasons that do not include 
improving economic efficiency and social welfare (see Elster 1989).  
  The social norm of tipping provides an interesting case study in this important debate. 
Because tipping is the norm in several occupations but not in others, examining the 
characteristics of the occupations in which tipping is the norm may provide insights about what 
creates social norms. For example, if tipping exists mainly in occupations in which the consumer 
can monitor service quality easily and accurately, this supports the conjecture that tipping (and 
maybe other social norms as well) is created to improve economic efficiency. 
  In addition to being a case study that can provide insights about social norms in general, 
tipping is an important social norm from an economic perspective. Tipping in US restaurants 
alone is about $27 billion a year (Azar 2004a) and obviously the figure is much higher if we add    
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tips in other establishments and countries. In addition, millions of workers in the US alone derive 
most of their income from tips (Wessels 1997).  
  One of the most intriguing questions about tipping is why tipping is the norm in several 
occupations but not in others. Why is it common to tip waiters but not flight attendants? Why do 
we tip taxi drivers, but not bus drivers? If our lawyer makes a special effort and does extremely 
well for us, why don’t we tip her? This article addresses these questions for the first time. Using 
several books about tipping practices, 37 tipped and non-tipped occupations were chosen, the 
prevalence of tipping in each occupation was ranked, and judges ranked various characteristics 
of these occupations. The empirical analysis tries to find how these various characteristics affect 
the prevalence of tipping in an occupation. The analysis refutes the common belief that tipping 
exists in occupations in which the consumer can monitor the worker more easily than the firm. 
The analysis suggests instead that tipping exists when the consumer wants to reciprocate and to 
show gratitude for good service or when he feels empathy and compassion for the worker. The 
implications of these results for the question whether the norm of tipping is created to increase 
social welfare are then addressed.  
  The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the question what 
determines which occupations are tipped. Section 3 presents the data and explains how it was 
collected. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
2.  What Determines which Occupations Are Tipped?  
2.1   Economic  Efficiency 
To understand why tipping exists only in some occupations but not in others we should    
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first answer why tipping exists at all. Lynn and McCall (2000) summarize the common beliefs 
very well: 
Economists believe that tipping exists because it is the most efficient way of 
monitoring and rewarding the efforts of service workers (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 
1994; Hemenway, 1984; Jacob & Page, 1980). The intangible and highly customized 
nature of many services makes it difficult for firms to monitor and control the 
quality of services delivered by their employees (Shamir, 1984; Zeithaml, Berry & 
Parasuraman, 1988). Tipping is thought to be a way of enlisting the customers’ help 
in performing these quality control functions.  
 
Returning to the question why tipping exists only in some occupations, these beliefs 
imply that tipping exists when consumers can monitor the worker more easily than the firm can. 
This implication suggests that tipping (which is a form of consumer monitoring since the tip can 
be determined according to service quality) is created in the cases where it improves economic 
efficiency and social welfare. If this common belief is true, we should observe tipping in 
occupations where the consumer can monitor workers relatively easily.  
  To compare monitoring by the firm to consumer monitoring, it is useful first to 
distinguish between the two main components of service quality. One component is personal: 
how friendly the worker is, whether he relates well with the customer and so on. The second 
component is professional – how well the worker performs his professional task. To clarify this 
idea, take the example of a waiter: the personal part of service quality is determined by how    
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friendly he is, and the professional part includes how well he can describe items on the menu, 
and how efficient he is in taking orders, bringing dishes, taking used dishes and so on.
1  
  When is the consumer likely to have lower monitoring costs than the firm? Obviously, 
the consumer is in a better position than the firm to evaluate the quality of the personal part of 
the service. The consumer knows immediately how friendly the worker is, while the firm, if it 
can obtain this information at all, has to incur costs to do so. Consequently, the more important is 
the personal part of the service, the more advantage the consumer has over the firm in evaluating 
service quality.  
  Another important issue is how much the consumer can evaluate the professional part of 
the service. The consumer, for example, can evaluate well whether his barber did a good job, but 
he finds it much harder to evaluate the quality of the professional component of the service 
provided by his accountant or his lawyer. For example, the customer does not know whether his 
accountant could use certain rules to lower his taxes and did not do so. Consequently, the more 
the consumer can evaluate the professional part of the service, the more likely he is to have lower 
monitoring costs than the firm.  
  Obviously, the importance of the consumer’s ability to evaluate the professional part of 
the service depends on what portion of service quality is attributed to the professional part. A 
natural measure of how easy it is for the consumer to monitor the worker overall is to take a 
                                                 
1 Another example for the distinction between the two service components appears in the questionnaire in the 
Appendix (see question 4). Other scholars have proposed additional ways in which servers’ roles can be divided: 
Israeli and Barkan (2004) stress the division between the technical and functional aspects of service, while Barkan 
and Israeli (2004) emphasize that servers have two roles with regard to tipping behavior: the role of expert and the 
role of manager.    
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weighted average of the consumer’s abilities to monitor the professional component and the 
personal component. Assuming the consumer can accurately evaluate the personal component, 
the measure for the consumer’s monitoring ability on a 0-10 scale can be computed as: 
(1)      MON-ABI  =  10p  +  m(1  − p), 
where p is the portion of overall service quality that stems from the personal component and m is 
how well the consumer can evaluate the professional part of the service (on a 0-10 scale). This 
leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: If tipping is created where it can improve economic efficiency then tipped 
occupations should have a relatively high value of MON-ABI. 
2.2  Future Service, Empathy, Compassion, and Showing Gratitude  
  What else, other than economic efficiency, can be the reason why tipping exists? One 
potential reason may be that people tip to get better service. Since tipping occurs after the service 
has already been provided, this can apply only to customers who intend to receive service from 
the same worker in the future. But we see travelers who tip in places they never intend to come 
back to and people often tip taxi drivers although their chances of meeting the same driver again 
are negligible. Moreover, future service seems not to be a reason for tipping by repeated 
customers as well (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Bodvarsson and Gibson 1994; Azar 
2002).    
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  Another reason for the existence of tipping is that people may derive psychological utility 
from tipping in certain conditions.
2 Tipping allows the tipper to reciprocate and show gratitude, 
or to express compassion or empathy, improving his self-image and increasing his utility.
3 In a 
study that asked people what their reasons for tipping were (Economic Development Committee 
for the Hotel and Catering Industry 1970), several potential reasons for tipping were given and 
respondents chose one or more that applied to them. 53 percent reported “It is a good way of 
showing gratitude for good service or cooking,” and 19 percent agreed with “Staff need the extra 
income from tips.” In the same study, another question asked people why they sometimes tip on 
top of service charges. 67 percent claimed “When service is really good,” 50 percent agreed with 
“It is a way of saying ‘thank you’,” 20 percent reported “You suspect that not all the service 
charge will be given to the staff,” and 7 percent mentioned “You feel generous.” These answers 
suggest that people are willing to pay to show gratitude for good service and to supplement low 
wages of workers. Additional support for low income of workers as a reason for tipping appears 
in Crespi (1947), who presents poll results that suggest that most people approve of tipping “by 
and large” but only because wages are inadequate for certain service workers. 
  If tipping is created because people want to reciprocate and to show gratitude for good 
service, in which occupations do we expect tipping to emerge? People are likely to be more 
                                                 
2 Once tipping becomes the social norm in a certain situation, people may suffer a disutility from disobeying the 
norm (and they may derive a positive utility from conforming to the norm). This is not the source of utility I refer to 
above, however; rather, I mean a utility that one derives regardless of tipping being the social norm. 
3 The idea that self-image may affect utility is not common in economics, but is not new either: Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), for example, propose a utility function that incorporates identity as a motivation for behavior, where identity 
includes both the category to which a person belongs and his self-image. Similarly, Loewenstein (1999) argues that 
self-esteem often motivates behavior.    
 
7 
concerned about reciprocating and showing gratitude to someone they feel close to. The closer 
the relationship established during the provision of the service, the more we can expect to see 
tipping.  
  In what cases consumers are likely to feel more empathy and compassion for the worker, 
and want to express these feelings by tipping him? First, these feelings will be stronger when the 
consumer feels close to the worker. Second, consumers feel more empathy and compassion for 
the worker and therefore are more willing to tip him the lower his income is, as the answers to 
the survey mentioned above suggest. Another reasonable conjecture is that people feel more 
compassion for the worker the higher is the difference between their income and the worker’s; 
we can therefore expect to see more tipping in occupations that are associated with high-income 
customers, other things being equal. This discussion leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: If tipping is motivated by psychological utility due to the willingness to 
reciprocate and to show gratitude and due to empathy and compassion for the worker, we 
would expect tipping to be higher in occupations in which the customer feels close to the 
worker after the service is provided, and when the worker’s income is low and the 
customer’s income is high. 
3.  The Data 
  To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, we should examine how the 
norm to tip certain occupations and not others is related to several characteristics of the 
occupations: the consumer’s monitoring ability, the closeness between the worker and the 
consumer, the worker’s income, and the consumer’s income. I compiled a list of tipped    
 
8 
occupations, using several books about tipping practices: Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt 
(1984), Star (1988), and Post (1997).  
  Several types of occupations were excluded from the list of tipped occupations: the first 
type is occupations in which tips represent the price of the service rather than an incentive for 
better service. For example, tipping skycaps is more a form of paying for their services than a 
means of inducing them to provide better service, since the service they offer is quite 
homogenous. In these occupations the monitoring ability of the customer is irrelevant because 
tipping is no longer a way to monitor the worker, so it is better to leave those occupations outside 
the dataset rather than to get results that cannot be interpreted because they come from two 
completely different types of tipping.  
  The second group of occupations not included in the list is when tips are given in the 
form of holiday gifts or bonuses, because it is not clear whether to treat these holiday 
gifts/bonuses as tips. Clearly, an annual bonus is not the same as tips that follow each interaction 
in the incentives and monitoring that it provides, yet it offers more incentives than no tipping at 
all.  
  To the list of tipped occupations (23 in total) I added 14 service occupations of various 
types that are not tipped. Since all tipping takes place in service occupations and when the 
service is provided to people (i.e., not to firms), the non-tipped occupations chosen are also of 
services provided to people (so they could potentially be candidates for tipping). The complete 
list of occupations appears in Table 1.  
  To evaluate to what extent tipping is prevalent in each occupation, I consulted three 
books on tipping: Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt (1984), Star (1988), and Post (1997). Star 
discusses tipping practices around the globe, while Post and Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt    
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focus on tipping in the United States. According to the tipping practices reported in the books, I 
ranked on a 0-5 scale how common is tipping in each occupation, that is, a measure of what 
percentage of service encounters will be tipped (denoted by COMMON). For example, it is well 
known that waiters should be tipped and almost everyone tips them. It is less unanimous whether 
hotel chambermaids should be tipped – for example some sources suggest that they should be 
tipped only by those staying more than one night. Therefore, waiters have a higher score than 
chambermaids.  
  Using the data in the books I also ranked on a 0-5 scale how important are tips as a 
source of income in each occupation, that is, a measure of the part of total income of workers in 
each occupation that comes from tips (denoted by IMPORTANCE). Both of these scores were 
based primarily on the tipping practices in the United States, but with some consideration of 
tipping practices in other countries. Thus, lawyers (who are not tipped at all) received a lower 
score than gas station attendants (who are not tipped in the United States but are tipped in several 
other countries). I also computed the sum of COMMON + IMPORTANCE and denoted it as 
TIPPING (so TIPPING is on a 0-10 scale). While COMMON and IMPORTANCE are obviously 
correlated, summing them gives a better measure of “how much tipped” is each occupation than 
each of them separately. 
  To evaluate all the other characteristics of each occupation, I asked six judges to grade 
several variables regarding each of the occupations. The judges were heterogeneous in terms of 
ages (21 – 56) and occupations. The questionnaire given to the judges is presented in the 
Appendix.
4 While in principle one could use a single judge to get data on characteristics of 
                                                 
4 The only variable on which I could hope to have formal data is the worker’s income. There are two important 
reasons why I used ranking by the judges for this variable. First, I did not find any formal data about the income of    
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occupations and use it to run regressions of tipping prevalence on occupation characteristics, 
using six different judges and averaging their responses creates more accurate measures of the 
occupation characteristics. It ensures that even if a certain judge has a biased perception about 
one of the occupations, his effect on the relevant score is small.
5 The average responses to 
questions 1, 2, and 3 were coded as the variables CLOSE, WORKER-INC, and CONS-INC, for 
closeness, worker’s income, and consumer’s income.  
  The answers for questions 4 and 5 were combined to create a single score of the 
consumer’s ability to monitor the worker based on equation (1) and the discussion preceding it.
6 
There are two different ways to create an average for the consumer’s monitoring ability, 
however. One way is to take the average response for questions 4 and 5, and use equation (1) on 
the averages (the variable created is denoted MON-ABI1). A second way is to compute for each 
judge his monitoring ability for each occupation based on equation (1), and then take the average 
result across all judges, yielding the variable denoted MON-ABI2. Formally, if Pi is the response 
of judge i to question 4 divided by 10 (to yield a number between 0 and 1), Mi is his response to 
question 5, and n is the number of judges (six in this case), then the two variables are defined as 
follows: 
MON-ABI1 = 10(ΣiPi/n) + (ΣiMi/n)[1 – (ΣiPi/n)], and 
                                                                                                                                                             
many occupations in the list. Second, the perception of consumers about the worker’s income is more important than 
the true income, because this perception is what (potentially) affects the consumer’s willingness to tip the worker. 
The rankings by the judges represent the perception of various consumers.  
5 Increasing the number of judges further could decrease more the effect of any single judge on the scores, but  the 
mean response and therefore the results are not likely to be significantly affected by such an increase.  
6 The answer to question 4 is 10p and the answer to question 5 is m in terms of equation (1).     
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MON-ABI2 = Σi [10Pi + Mi(1 – Pi)]/n. 
Table 1 presents the value of COMMON, IMPORTANCE, TIPPING, CLOSE, WORKER-INC, 
CONS-INC, MON-ABI1, and MON-ABI2 for the 37 occupations. As can be seen in Table 1, 
there are differences between MON-ABI1 and MON-ABI2, but they are relatively small. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
4.  Estimation and Results 
  To test the hypotheses discussed before, several specifications were estimated using OLS 
regressions. The dependent variable is one of the measures for tipping prevalence –COMMON, 
IMPORTANCE, or TIPPING. For COMMON and IMPORTANCE I report the main regression 
which takes MON-ABI2 as the monitoring ability score and uses the entire sample. For the 
dependent variable TIPPING, I also report the results of using MON-ABI1 instead of MON-
ABI2, and of a regression that looks only on tipped occupations (therefore with 24 observations 
instead of 37).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
  The estimation results are reported in Table 2. Surprisingly, Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported by the data. There is a negative coefficient for monitoring ability in all five 
regressions, while Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive coefficient. This implies that economic 
efficiency does not seem to be the reason for the creation of tipping. Tipping is not more 
prevalent in those occupations in which consumers can easily monitor workers, as opposed to the 
common wisdom to date. This does not mean that tipping reduces economic efficiency or that    
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tipping exists when the consumer has higher monitoring costs than the firm. What it means is 
that if tipping was created according to economic efficiency considerations (lowering monitoring 
costs), the set of occupations in which tipping exists would have been very different from what it 
is today. 
  The worker’s income is negatively correlated with tipping, a result which is statistically 
significant at the 1-percent level in all regressions. The coefficient of the worker’s income is also 
large.
7 The closeness established between the worker and the consumer is positively correlated 
with tipping, a result which is statistically significant at the 1-percent level in 3 out of the 5 
regressions. The consumer’s income is positively correlated with tipping at a significance level 
of 10 or 5 percent in 3 out of the 5 regressions. Thus the results are consistent with the 
predictions of Hypothesis 2, suggesting that tipping exists in those occupations in which 
consumers have psychological utility from tipping due to a desire to reciprocate and show 
gratitude, and to empathy and compassion for the low-income worker.   
  As was mentioned in the introduction, one of the interesting and controversial issues 
about social norms is whether they are created to increase social welfare. What can we say about 
tipping based on the empirical results? At first, it seems that since tipping was not created where 
consumers have low monitoring costs, tipping was not created to increase social welfare. But if 
people derive utility from showing gratitude for good service, or if they enjoy tipping a low-
income worker because it allows them to feel generous and kind and thus improves their self-
                                                 
7 The smaller coefficients of the independent variables when COMMON and IMPORTANCE are the dependent 
variables follow naturally from the narrower scale of these variables (0-5) compared to the scale of TIPPING (0-10).    
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esteem, then these sources of utility should also be included in social welfare.
8 Once we take 
these sources of utility into account, it is certainly possible that the creation of tipping increased 
social welfare. Tipping is created in these occupations in which consumers derive the most 
psychological utility from it, because they are the most likely to feel empathy and compassion 
and to be willing to show their gratitude; this happens when they feel close to the worker, the 
worker receives low wages, and the consumers have high income. Consequently, while the 
results undermine the common wisdom that tipping is created where it improves economic 
efficiency by lowering monitoring costs, the results can still support the view that tipping is 
created where it improves social welfare. 
5.   Conclusion   
  A common belief about tipping is that tipping is created in these occupations in which 
consumers can easily monitor the worker and therefore can do so at a lower cost than the firm. 
Indeed, looking at a few prominent examples seems to justify this belief: we tip waiters and taxi 
                                                 
8 Since tips are voluntary payments and people tip also when they never intend to see the worker again, they 
obviously derive some kind of utility from tipping. Once tipping certain workers becomes a social norm, one may 
argue that the only utility is derived from conforming to the norm (or avoiding the disutility associated with 
disobeying the norm). But two observations suggest that people tip not only to conform to the norm: first, people 
often tip more than required by the norm. Second, the first people to tip in a situation that was not tipped before 
clearly did not conform to any social norm; on the contrary – they did something unique and uncommon. So they too 
had a reason for tipping other than conforming to the social norm. Azar (2004b) and the answers given in the survey 
mentioned earlier (Economic Development Committee for the Hotel and Catering Industry 1970) also support the 
view that people derive utility from tipping beyond the conformity to the social norm.     
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drivers because we can easily evaluate their service quality, we do not tip lawyers and 
accountants because we lack the professional knowledge required to evaluate them.  
  This article takes for the first time a more systematic approach to examine this common 
belief, by consulting several books about tipping practices, listing 37 tipped and non-tipped 
occupations, and asking judges to rank various characteristics of these occupations. Surprisingly, 
the common belief turns out to be false: economic efficiency does not explain why tipping exists 
in some occupations and not in others. The hypothesis that tipping is created where it gives the 
most psychological utility to consumers is supported by the data, as reflected in the prevalence of 
tipping being higher when the worker’s income is lower, when the worker establishes closer 
relationship with the consumer, and when the consumer’s income is higher. These results suggest 
that tipping was created in those occupations in which consumers felt empathy and compassion 
toward the worker because of his low income or their high income, and in which they wanted to 
reciprocate and to show gratitude for good service. Including the utility derived from improved 
self-esteem and the ability to show gratitude in the definition of social welfare, the results are 
consistent with the view that social norms are created where they improve social welfare, even 
though tipped occupations are not those where the consumer can most easily monitor service 
quality.  
Appendix: Instructions Given to the Judges 
We would be grateful if you can answer the following questionnaire for a research conducted 
about tipping. 
Please look at the attached list of occupations to get a first impression. Think a little about the    
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type of service given by each of the workers listed before answering the questions. It is 
recommended to answer each time a single question for all the workers listed, and only then to 
proceed to the next question and so on. 
1.   Rank on a 0-10 scale how close you would feel to the worker, after he provided 
you the service (10 being the highest closeness). 
2.   Rank on a 0-10 scale what you think is the worker’s income not including tips (10 
being the highest income). 
3.   Rank on a 0-10 scale what you think is the income of the typical customer that 
uses this service (10 being the highest income). 
4.  Service quality often consists of two components: personal and professional. Take 
the example of a lawyer: the personal component means how friendly he is to the 
client, while the professional component is how knowledgeable the lawyer is in 
the law and how hard he works to promote the client’s interests. First, try to think 
about each occupation what you would consider good service and what would be 
bad service. Then, think about the relative magnitude of the personal component 
and the professional component in each occupation. What percentage of the 
worker’s overall service quality stems from the personal component in your 
opinion? Divide this number by 10 and write the result in the column 4, 
“Importance of personal component” (This number should be between 0 and 10). 
5.   To what extent do you think you can evaluate the professional part of the service 
provided by the workers in the list? Rank it on a 0-10 scale, where 0 means that 
you cannot evaluate the quality of the professional part of the service at all and 10 
means that you can evaluate it accurately. Ignore the personal part of the service    
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when answering this part. In the lawyer’s case, for example, the question means 
how much you can evaluate whether the lawyer gives a lot of attention to your 
case, is knowledgeable in relevant laws, and is doing everything possible to 
promote your interests. 
 
  1. Closeness to 
worker after service 
is provided 
2. Worker’s income 
not including tips 
3. Income of 
typical 
customer 
4. Importance of 
personal 
component 





waiter   
 
    
…          
 
The rest of the occupations in the questionnaire are the same as in Table 1, and in the same order. 
They are not included here in order to preserve space.  
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Characteristics of Various Occupations 
 COMMON  IMPORTA
NCE 






Restaurant  waiter  5  5  10  5.33 1.50 6.00 8.70 8.60 
Taxi  driver  5 3 8 3.67  4.67  6.33  8.10  8.33 
Hotel  chambermaid  2 2 4 2.00  3.17  6.67  7.83  8.02 
Movers (when moving to a 
new apartment) 
4 4 8 4.67  3.67  5.17  8.25  8.30 
Pizza delivery person  4  4  8 2.17  3.33  5.00 6.61 6.68 
Barber  4 2 6 5.67  5.67  5.00  8.97  9.12 
Tour  guide  3 2 5 6.67  6.83  6.67  8.70  8.72 
Cabin steward on a cruise  4  4  8  3.17  3.83  7.50  7.52  7.60 
Plumber  0 0 0 2.50  6.33  5.17  6.80  6.83 
Doctor  0 0 0 5.67  8.67  4.33  7.64  7.65 
Accountant  0 0 0 5.17  9.17  8.17  7.04  6.90 
Lawyer  0 0 0 6.17  9.50  7.50  7.26  7.17 
Flight  attendant  0 0 0 4.67  6.50  7.00  8.39  8.32 
Nurse  0 0 0 6.00  5.83  3.67  8.08  8.02 
Bus  driver  0 0 0 2.00  5.83  2.50  7.44  7.48 
Lifeguard (in the 
beach/swimming pool) 
0 0 0 1.33  5.50  3.00  5.66  5.75 
Seller  at  McDonald  0 0 0 1.17  3.17  4.33  7.62  7.77 
Dentist  0 0 0 5.33  8.67  6.33  7.89  7.87 
Wine steward in a 
restaurant 
4 5 9 4.33  5.00  7.67  7.66  7.57 
Car  wash  worker  3 4 7 3.50  2.83  6.50  7.57  7.72 
Casino  dealer  2 3 5 4.83  5.83  7.17  6.64  6.68    
 
20 
Busboy (cleans tables etc.) 
on a cruise 
3 4 7 2.33  3.33  7.50  7.91  8.15 
Facials (cosmetic 
treatment) 
3 4 7 6.50  5.83  6.83  8.58  8.62 
Car  mechanic  0 0 0 4.50  6.17  5.67  6.54  6.58 
Manicure/pedicure 3 4 7 6.50  5.33  7.17  8.39  8.37 
Masseuse/Masseur 2 3 5 6.33  5.83  8.33  8.17  8.13 
Newspaper boy (brings the 
paper every morning) 
2 4 6 1.50  3.00  6.50  6.39  6.20 
Bartender  4 4 8 5.50  4.83  6.33  7.85  7.77 
Washroom attendant in a 
restaurant 
2 4 6 0.67  2.50  6.00  7.71  7.78 
Diving  instructor  1 1 2 7.33  6.33  7.17  8.33  8.28 
Ski  instructor  1 1 2 6.67  6.50  8.33  8.40  8.43 
Tennis  instructor  0 0 0 7.17  6.83  8.83  8.53  8.55 
Theater/concert  ushers  0 0 0 1.50  3.83  7.00  7.67  7.72 
Room  service  waiter  4 4 8 2.67  3.67  7.83  7.78  7.80 
Golf  caddy  4 4 8 4.17  3.33  9.00  8.36  8.22 
Cashier in a store  0  0  0  3.17  3.83  4.50  8.49  8.45 
Gas  station  attendant  1 2 3 1.17  2.83  5.33  8.11  8.13 
Average  1.89 2.08 3.97 4.15 5.12 6.32 7.77 7.79 
Standard  deviation  1.75 1.75 3.51 1.96 1.94 1.55 0.74 0.74 
 
The variables COMMON, IMPORTANCE and TIPPING are based on various sources about 
tipping practices. CLOSE, WORKER-INC, and CONS-INC are the mean response of the judges 
to questions 1, 2, and 3 (see Appendix), respectively. MON-ABI1 and MON-ABI2 are computed 
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2  0.58 0.58 0.29 0.50 0.62 
F  Value  48.14 49.08 6.43  51.96 38.97 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Represents statistically significant at the 10-percent level. 
** Represents statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
*** Represents statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 